Really Full-Blooded Platonism
Consider, in particular, the following competitor, namely, Really Full Blooded Platonism: (RFBP) Every mathematical theory-consistent and inconsistent aliketruly describes some part of the mathematical realm. The difference between FBP and RFBP is that the latter but not the former admits inconsistent theories-theories explored at length, for example, in C. Mortensen [1995] . Such theories are (classically) inconsistent but nonetheless nontrivial. That is, such theories contain both A and ~A, for some A in the language; this is the inconsistency side of such theories. Despite this, such theories are not trivial; that is, there is at least one B in the language such that B is not an element of the theory. All of this is captured nicely by noting that such theories are underwritten by so-called paraconsistent logics. A logic, £, is paraconsistent iff its consequence relation, h, is such that A, ~A \f B, for some A and B? The very existence of inconsistent mathematics raises two important points with respect to Balaguer's project. I discuss each point briefly in turn.
The first point is this: Balaguer is wrong to claim that FBP is the only theory to solve Benacerraf's challenge. After all, FBP is supposed to solve the problem by expanding platonic heaven to such a degree that one's cognitive faculties can't miss it (as it were). (If you're having trouble hitting the target, then just make your target bigger! This is the heart of Balaguer's strategy.) But, then, since RFBP simply expands the heavens even further, then RFBP solves the problem if FBP does. Hence, Balaguer is wrong to point to FBP as a lone contender.
Before turning to the second point let me quickly set aside a natural worry. One might argue that expansion of platonic heaven is generally good, but expansion can also be bad. The objection is that RFBP leads quickly to the worst sort of expansion, namely, trivialism-expansion to the utmost trivial limit. The argument is this. If RFBP is true, then at least some contradictions-some instances of A A ~ A-are true. But if some contradictions are true, then everything is true, which is easily shown via C. I. Lewis's familiar independence argument Thus, if RFBP is admitted, then platonic heaven is indeed big, but it's too big-it bursts into triviality.
It is pretty clear, I think, that this sort of worry is a bad one on many fronts. The most critical problem, however, is that the Lewis independence argument is not valid in paraconsistent logics. This should be clear. After all, if, as inconsistent mathematics allows, A A ~A really is true, then unless everything is true-which the classical logician denies-the argument from A A ~A is an argument from truth to at least one untruth, B. Hence, the argument is not valid. For this reason, the objection doesn't get off the ground.
Consider, then, the second important point arising from the existence of inconsistent mathematics. We have seen above that FBP is not the only theory to solve Benacerraf's problem; RFBP does the trick just as well. But now notice that we have a decision to make between these rivals. Should we go with FBP or RFBP? The second point is that RFBP seems to be preferable.
Why is RFBP preferable? The reasoning can be put concisely. In short, FBP is either informal or not. If informal, then FBP is inconsistent; if not, then FBP is incomplete. If the former, then we should go with RFBP, since in effect we are there already. If the latter, then we should go with RFBP, since inconsistent mathematics affords completeness, which I take to be an obvious virtue. Either way, then, RFBP is preferable.
That formal theories buy their consistency at the price of completeness is well known. I will say a word, however, as to why informal mathematics is inconsistent. This can be seen by considering "Godel's paradox', as Priest ([1987] , p. 59) calls it. Consider the sentence: (7) 7 is (informally) unprovable. If 7 is false, then it is provably true, and so true. By reductio 7 is true. Since we have just (informally) proved 7, 7 is (informally) provable. But since true, 7 is (informally) unprovable. Contradiction.
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There seems to be little hope of denying that 7 is indeed a sentence of our informal mathematics. Accordingly, the only way to avoid the above result is to revert to formalising away the inconsistency -a response familiar from the histories of naive set theory, naive semantic theory, and so on. If one does this, however, then (by familiar results) one loses completeness, which can be regained only by endorsing inconsistency. 4 Either way, then, we seem to be led to inconsistent mathematics.
can do the trick just as well. Moreover, there seems to be positive reason for endorsing RFBP. In short, FBP is either inconsistent or incomplete. If the former, we should endorse RFBP, since in effect we are there already. If the latter, we should endorse RFBP, since RFBP can give us the desired completeness.
Balaguer's strategy is ingenious in many ways. But if we really are going to expand platonic heaven in an effort to ensure our epistemic footing, then we need to explore the option of expanding heaven to its nontrivial limits. If this option is to be rejected, then we need good reason for rejecting it. For now, no such reason seems to exist. 
